The political economy of constitutional conflict in Hong Kong by Mushkat, M & Mushkat, R
Miron Mushkat and Roda Mushkat 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONFLICT IN HONG KONG 
INTRODUCTION 
JL re-1997 Hong Kong had a generally robust legal system by virtue of its status 
as a British colony and the political liberalization gradually pursued by the local 
government with London's blessing. The constitutional component of that 
system, however, was not necessarily its most sturdy part. A less enlightened 
policy establishment might have taken undue advantage of the considerable 
scope for manoeuvre afforded by a distinctly elastic framework without 
contravening the law in the strict sense of the term. Besides its rather loose 
nature, the framework did not lack authoritarian elements.1 
Post-1997 Hong Kong appears to be resting on more solid constitutional 
foundations, at least in theory. Its Basic Law qualifies as a constitution, both in 
its form and substance. The document is rather elaborate and relatively precise 
(by constitutional standards). Further, it has it roots in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, a binding international legal 
agreement carrying significant symbolic importance.2 A democratic colonial 
power may have thus departed, and one that may have not yet completely 
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jettisoned its legacy of socialist-style arbitrary rule may have assumed 
sovereignty over the territory, but on the face of it Hong Kong seems 
paradoxically to have enhanced its constitutional position as a result of this 
momentous change in the political status quo.3 
This is the formal side of the picture. In practice, although China has 
thus far not unambiguously deviated from the spirit and letter of the Joint 
Declaration, and while has not glaringly breached the Basic Law, it may have 
erred on the side of (authoritarian) caution in guiding (explicitly or implicitly) 
constitutional development in Hong Kong and responding (directly or indirectly) 
to problems arising from the implementation of the Basic Law. This pattern has 
not manifested itself across the board. There have been virtually no attempts to 
stifle private enterprise, or revamp the institutions underpinning it, but the stance 
vis-a-vis political freedoms (broadly defined) has been less accommodating. 
The national security legislation proposed by the local government, 
apparently at the behest of the central authorities in Beijing, is perhaps the most 
telling case in point. This new initiative constitutes the most radical departure 
from the generally benign practices prevailing before the transfer of sovereignty 
and during the initial phase of the transition to Chinese "rule." The legislation, to 
be passed under Article 23 of the Basic Law, introduces in an unpalatable form 
the crimes of subversion and secession, and grants the government extensive 
powers to ban non-mainstream groups (Table 1). It has the potential, in the 
present climate, to pave the way for actions inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of human rights, and hence arguably the Basic Law as originally 
conceived. 
Table 1 
Repression in Hong Kong 
Taking advantage of preoccupation in Hong Kong with the SARS epidemic, the 
territory's pro-Beijing government has been pushing along a noxious national 
security bill that would leave the territory vulnerable to the sort of political repression 
common on the Communist mainland. It may be too late to block the law, which 
looks likely to pass on July 9. But it should be made clear to Beijing that nobody 
buys its justifications for this repressive measure. 
The measure, known as Article 23, deals with treason, sedition, subversion and 
the theft of state secrets, and includes provisions that would enable the Hong Kong 
government to crack down on organizations deemed to be linked to any that are 
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banned in China, such as Falun Gong. That would seriously erode the autonomy that 
the former British colony was promised when it came under China's rule six years 
ago under the formula of "one country, two systems." 
Some governments, including the United States and Canada, have already 
protested, as have many human-rights organizations, prompting predictable squawks 
from Beijing against meddling in its internal affairs. That can hardly be said of 
opponents in Hong Kong, who turned out in the tens of thousands on the 14lh 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising, and now plan an even larger protest 
against Article 23 for July 1, the anniversary of the turnover of Hong Kong. The 
resistance draws on an expanding coalition of human-rights groups, independent 
politicians, trade unions, journalists, academics, and students. They have correctly 
identified the bill as a challenge to their autonomy and fundamental freedoms, and as 
an attempt to impose China's arbitrary legal system on Hong Kong through the back 
door. 
China argues that Article 23 is not much different from the laws of some 
democratic states. That may be so, but democratic societies have checks and balances 
that China and other Communist states do not; in the latter, national security laws 
have long been a primary tool for silencing critics and subverting freedoms. The fate 
of Falun Gong is but one example. Another is SARS: Under the new law, the dogged 
newspapers of Hong Kong might have been forced into the same disgraceful and 
dangerous silence as the mainland press. 
China's rulers have also portrayed Article 23 as a critical test of national 
sovereignty. It is really an assault on the freedoms they promised to respect in Hong 
Kong for 50 years. Even if the bill cannot be stopped, it should be widely exposed 
and condemned for the repressive measure it really is. 
Source: International Herald Tribune, June 28-29, 2003, p. 4. 
This development is serious enough to revive concerns that have largely receded 
in recent years. The "one country, two systems" concept, enshrined in the Joint 
Declaration and designed to insure an effective separation of Hong Kong's 
capitalist institutions from their mainland socialist counterparts, may be at risk 
of material erosion. Given the scale and pace of economic reform in China, the 
relevance of the distinction between capitalism and socialism can be legitimately 
questioned in this particular context. However, it is appropriate to differentiate 
between the (not yet fully erected) liberal democratic facade (including the rule 
of law) in Hong Kong and the authoritarian political structure enduring on the 
mainland. It is the former, its international legal and constitutional roots 
notwithstanding, whose future viability cannot be taken for granted.5 
Chinese policy makers evidently subscribe to the view that commitment 
to economic liberalism need not be coupled with one to that of the political 
variety. This stance requires no fine-tuning even in a setting where capitalist 
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institutions are firmly anchored in the common law and an affluent population 
has grown accustomed to expressing its voice in a meaningful fashion through a 
number of channels. While there are no concrete signs that the aversion toward 
political freedoms is propelling China to curtail Hong Kong's autonomy, or deny 
it the right to exercise fully the international powers guaranteed in the Joint 
Declaration, such a scenario cannot be ruled out.6 
Gradual tightening of the constitutional framework may not have far-
reaching implications for Hong Kong and hardly any repercussions for China. 
On the other hand, a discernible shift in an authoritarian direction could prove 
costly for both the former and the latter, albeit undoubtedly not to the same 
extent. Indeed, even the international community might be adversely affected. 
The purpose of this paper thus is to restate the importance of a progressive 
constitutional order for Hong Kong. However, because that scarcely qualifies as 
a controversial proposition, the principal focus is on exploring, from a politico-
economic/game-theoretic perspective, key dimensions of the complex 
relationship between the territory and China, as well as drawing the necessary 
policy conclusions. 
1 COSTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL "MISMANAGEMENT" 
Since its absorption into the British Empire to the present, Hong Kong has 
displayed remarkable flexibility and dynamism. It has not sought to reshape its 
external environment, but has adapted rapidly and effectively to impulses 
originating from other parts of the region/world. Such adaptation has often 
entailed a radical transformation of the socio-economic structure. The past half 
of a century has witnessed the most dramatic shifts on this front. The Korean 
War served as a catalyst for brisk industrialization and the opening up of China 
following the Cultural Revolution provided the impetus for the emergence of a 
vibrant service sector.7 
Interestingly, socio-economic metamorphosis has taken place against the 
backdrop of notable stability in Hong Kong's modus operandi. The territory may 
have shed its form often, and unreservedly so, but throughout its history it has 
consistently functioned as an "intermediary of capital", that is, a pivot of 
decision-making about the exchange of capital within Asia and between the 
region and the rest of the world. Metropolises which perform this role normally 
serve as crucial points of intersection between local and foreign social networks 
Ibid. 
D.R. MEYER, HONG KONG AS A GLOBAL METROPOLIS. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
760 TFLR - MISCELLANEOUS [Vol. 11:756 
of capital (the term "social networks" is employed here to highlight the fact that 
intermediary decision-making about the exchange of capital rests on bonds that 
extend beyond pure market calculations of profit and loss to include deeper, 
wider social relations). 
After the curtain fell on Mao Zedong's ultra radical experiments -
notably, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution - and his more 
pragmatic successors adopted an "open-door" policy, Hong Kong has rapidly 
shifted the low end of its manufacturing sector (indeed, it has effectively "de-
industrialized") across the border and has reshaped itself as an intermediary of 
capital on a scale not witnessed previously, in the qualitative as well as the 
quantitative sense of the term. The post-1978 transformation has largely been 
geared toward maximizing opportunities arising from China's market reforms in 
general and its increasingly liberal trade regime in particular.9 
As an intermediary of capital with a pronounced mainland orientation, 
Hong Kong has reached new heights as China's financier, trading partner, 
middleman, and facilitator. It has thus played a prominent role in this context as 
a source of direct and indirect investment funds, as well as a provider of 
syndicated loans (financier). It has also acted as a major exporter and importer of 
goods/commodities and services, both directly (trading partner) and indirectly 
(middleman). Finally, it has functioned as a vital contact point, conduit of 
information and technology, and training ground (facilitator; Table 2).'° 
Ibid. 
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Table 2 
A Summary of the Role of Hong Kong in China's Open Door Policy 
Financier Direct investment 
Indirect investment 
Loan syndication 
Trading Partner Commodity trade 
Services trade 
Middleman Commodity trade entrepot trade 
trans-shipment 
brokerage in direct trade 
Services trade tourism 
loan syndication 
business consultancy 
Facilitator Contact point 
Conduit of information and 
technology 
Training ground marketing 
production 
Source: Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection, op. cit, p. 17. 
Prior to the post-1978 policy turnabout, China preferred direct trade because it 
could be employed as a potent political instrument. Having opted for a more 
outward-looking foreign policy, and having reaped the inevitable international 
rewards from embracing accommodation (i.e., having gained worldwide political 
recognition), China has no longer found it necessary to pursue simultaneously its 
trade and political agendas and has encouraged, rather than merely tolerated, the 
channelling of trade activities indirectly via Hong Kong, which has consequently 
thrived as a centre of intermediation. This economically-inspired strategy has 
been pursued vigorously for the past quarter of a century, benefiting enormously 
the two sides." 
The division of labour is underpinned by sound business logic. China 
lacks skills in intermediary services - including communications, finance, 
insurance, marketing, and legal services. Such skills, on the other hand, are 
abundant in Hong Kong. Further, intermediation requires fast response to shifts 
in global demand and quick identification of profitable opportunities. The Hong 
Kong economy enjoys minimal government intervention and is remarkably 
flexible (Table 3). One should not be surprised, therefore, that its more rigidly 
controlled Chinese counterpart has grown to depend heavily on Hong Kong-
sourced intermediary services.12 
Ibid.; Y.W. SUNG, THE EMERGENCE OF GREATER CHINA. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
SUNG, THE CHINA-HONG KONG CONNECTION, op. cit. 
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Table 3 
Index of Economic Freedom 
(2004 Rankings) 
Free 44 Armenia Swaziland 134 Sierra Leone 
1 Hong Kong France 91 Georgia Togo 
2 Singapore 46 Belize 92 Djibouti 136 Indonesia 
3 New Zealand Korea, South 93 Guinea 137 Haiti 
4 Luxembourg 48 Kuwait 94 Kenya 138 Syria 
5 Ireland Uganda 95 Burkina Faso 139 Congo, Rep. 
6 Estonia 50 Costa Rica Egypt Guinea 
Bissau 
7 United 
Kingdom 
51 Jordan Mozambique 141 Vietnam 
8 Denmark 52 Slovenia 98 Tanzania 142 Nigeria 
9 Switzerland 53 South Africa 99 Bosnia 143 Suriname 
10 United States 54 Greece 100 Algeria Repressed 
11 Australia Oman 101 Ethiopia 144 Cuba 
12 Sweden 56 Jamaica 102 Mali 145 Belarus 
13 Chile Poland 103 Kyrgyzstan 146 Tajikistan 
14 Cyprus 58 Panama Rwanda 147 Venezuela 
Finland Peru 105 Central 
African 
148 Iran 
16 Canada 60 Cape Verde Republic 149 Uzbekistan 
Mostly Free Qatar 106 Azerbaijan 150 Turkmenistan 
17 Iceland Thailand Paraguay 151 Burma 
18 Germany 63 Cambodia Turkey Laos 
19 Netherlands Mexico 109 Ghana 153 Zimbabwe 
20 Austria Mongolia Pakistan 154 Libya 
Bahrain 66 Morocco 111 Gabon 155 Korea, North 
22 Belgium 67 Mauritania Niger Unrated 
Lithuania Nicaragua 113 Benin Angola 
24 El Salvador Tunisia 114 Malawi Burundi 
25 Bahamas 70 Namibia Russia Democratic 
Republic 
26 Italy 71 Mauritius 116 Argentina of Congo 
27 Spain Mostly Unfree 117 Ukraine Iraq 
28 Norway 72 Senegal 118 Lesotho Sudan 
29 Israel 73 Macedonia Zambia Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Latvia 74 Philippines 120 Dominican 
31 Portugal Saudi Arabia Republic 
32 Czech 
Republic 
76 Fiji 121 Honduras 
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33 Barbados Sri Lanka India 
34 Taiwan 78 Bulgaria Nepal 
35 Slovak 
Republic 
79 Moldova 124 Chad 
36 Trinidad and 80 Albania Gambia 
Tobago Brazil 126 Ecuador 
37 Malta 82 Croatia 127 Cameroon 
38 Japan 83 Colombia 128 China 
39 Botswana Guyana 129 Romania 
Uruguay Lebanon 130 Equatorial 
41 Bolivia 86 Madagascar Guinea 
42 Hungary 87 Guatemala 131 Bangladesh 
United Arab Malaysia Kazakhstan 
Emirates 89 Ivory Coast Yemen 
Source: Asian Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2004, p. A7. 
It should be noted that, as a result of the implementation of the open-door policy, 
the number of Chinese export-import firms has increased significantly and that 
many now compete fiercely with the established Hong Kong players. However, 
most of the mainland operators are state-owned enterprises hampered by 
administrative controls. In the very long run, when economic reform reaches a 
more mature stage, efficient/profit-maximizing Chinese trading firms may 
emerge. Nevertheless, given economies of scale and economies of 
agglomeration in the provision of intermediary services, Hong Kong's status as 
the pre-eminent supplier of such services in the Greater China context should not 
be at risk, absent serious exogenous shocks.13 
Even in the very long run, Shanghai is the only Chinese city capable of 
challenging Hong Kong's position as a centre of intermediation. Still, its 
communication and transport infrastructure is not of a comparable standard and 
its service industries are rudimentary. China's commodity trade is shifting 
toward less bulky and heterogeneous goods and thus boosting the demand for 
Hong Kong-style intermediation. This trend is reinforced by the development of 
services trade and acceleration of investment flows, areas characterized by 
relatively high product heterogeneity. By the same token, the secular decline in 
transportation costs implies that the locational advantage of Shanghai is 
becoming less important, while proficiency in trading skills is assuming greater 
significance.14 
ibid. 
14
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The Chinese themselves are continuing to establish trading companies in 
Hong Kong, signalling that they recognize the territory's strengths as a centre of 
intermediation. Some local players regard the build-up ambivalently because this 
inevitably leads to further intensification of competitive pressures. However, 
from a broad macro perspective, the situation should not be viewed as a "zero-
sum game" due to positive spillovers resulting from economies of 
agglomeration: provided they act according to the "rules", the new entrants in 
fact enhance Hong Kong's status as a regional leader in the supply of 
intermediary services.15 
Hong Kong has been aptly described as a "global metropolis for Asia".16 
The portrayal rightly suggests that the scope of intermediation is not confined to 
Greater China. Rather, the territory serves as a meeting place for Asian and 
foreign social networks of capital. Further, the trade linkages embedded in its 
domestic exports, imports, and re-exports are global in nature. Its role as an 
emporium of finance, circulator of financial capital, risk control hub, and 
corporate management centre also has wide international ramifications, placing 
it functionally on a par with global metropolises/providers of intermediary 
services such as London and New York.17 
A tightening of the constitutional framework along conservative lines 
could arguably undermine this position at a considerable cost to Hong Kong, 
China, other parts of Asia, and the entire international community. The reason 
lies in the fact that high-level regional/worldwide intermediation cannot proceed 
smoothly in an environment where economic agents face hurdles which tangibly 
constrain their freedom of action. To control the exchange of commodity and 
financial capital, for example, intermediaries must acquire public and specialized 
information about demand and supply conditions in the markets in which they 
operate. Any delays in receipt and transmission of key messages are potentially 
very disruptive because intermediary profitability often hinges on being the first 
to make exchanges.18 
By the same token, intermediation cannot flourish unless rooted in trust. 
Otherwise, it may be prohibitively costly to monitor risks stemming from 
opportunistic and malfeasant behaviour of parties involved in the process. Since 
such risks are common and serious, demand for the norm of trustworthiness 
among intermediaries is exceptionally strong. Indeed, this explains their 
MEYER, op. cit. 
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preference for relying on networks that revolve around families, ethnic groups, 
and religious communities, whose members share beliefs and values and 
participate in relations that extend beyond the business domain and reach across 
nations. The high level of trust permeating these networks can be considered as a 
form of social capital that confers significant advantages on insiders.19 
A shift in an authoritarian direction on the constitutional front might thus 
have distinctly adverse implications for Hong Kong. A city driven by fear (of 
subversion and secession) cannot function as a dynamic centre of intermediation 
because of the element of uncertainty injected into information management 
(compounded by concerns about possible violations of "state secrecy" laws)"1 
and the undoubtedly corrosive effect on exchanges governed by the norm of 
trustworthiness, as well as the carefully nurtured social relationships underlying 
them. To paraphrase Fukuyama, a global metropolis propelled by intermediaries 
of capital needs to be sustained by a "culture of trust", rather than one of 
paranoia.21 
Conservative constitutional adjustment may also aggravate the "crisis of 
legitimacy" and exacerbate the problem of "political decay" in Hong Kong. The 
origins of the former can be traced to rising democratic aspirations in a complex 
urban environment, where the emerging social structure is skewed toward the 
middle class, against the backdrop of infringements on local autonomy by the 
new sovereign (and selectively its predecessor, in the twilight period of colonial 
rule). The lack of sensitivity displayed vis-a-vis these aspirations is a source of 
widespread cynicism that manifests itself directly and indirectly regarding 
government institutions and the policy establishment presiding over them." 
Political decay is another symptom of "reverse democratisation". It takes 
the form of a material deterioration in government performance as evidenced, 
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inter alia, by the adoption of a Third World-style personal rule at top echelons of 
the executive branch, reliance on patron-client networks, politicisation of the 
judiciary, cavalier attitude toward freedoms in general and civil liberties in 
particular, indifference to public opinion, poor response to demands emanating 
from the grass roots, erratic policy formulation and implementation, symbolic 
manipulation, and a propensity to play one segment of the community against 
another.23 Needless to say, a crisis of legitimacy and political decay are hardly 
conducive to social stability. And a potentially unstable social system, in turn, 
cannot serve on a long-term basis as a viable platform for the development of 
sophisticated intermediary services. As the editors of the South China Morning 
Post, not known for their liberal views, have opined: "Our freedoms are 
precious, they underpin the very fabric of our lives... Hong Kong's future as a 
unique place in Asia is at stake."24 
2 A GAME OF (MIS)TRUST 
The Joint Declaration offered a reassuring vision of a liberal constitutional 
government for Hong Kong, commensurate with its status as a thriving global 
metropolis and consistent with the aspirations of its increasingly self-assured, yet 
anxious, populace. The "one country, two systems" concept underlying it 
provided a seemingly viable institutional framework within which the capitalist 
enclave could effectively, albeit not necessarily in an unfettered fashion, pursue 
this vision to its logical conclusion while being politically absorbed into a 
socialist state slow to jettison deeply-entrenched authoritarian practices. The 
journey was expected to culminate in the creation of a robust liberal 
constitutional order resting on three pillars: a fully-fledged democracy, 
unwavering commitment to human rights, and scrupulous adherence to the rule 
of law.25 
The progressive vision embodied in the Joint Declaration has 
subsequently been diluted, although neither drastically nor harshly. The Basic 
Law, the constitutional cornerstone of the post-1997 system, for example, cannot 
be portrayed as the incarnation of the democratic spirit in its liberal form. The 
document paves the way for a more representative and accountable government, 
but the evolution toward this goal is distinctly slow and possibly uncertain. 
Indeed, it is legitimate to argue that the Basic Law reflects greater concern about 
S.H. Lo, GOVERNING HONG KONG. (New York: Nova, 2002). 
June 9, 2003, p. A10. 
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the "costs" of democratisation, particularly abrupt in nature, than those 
stemming from overly cautious adaptation."6 Electoral laws introduced following 
the transfer of sovereignty obscure the picture further.27 
Post-1997 constitutional mechanisms for the protection of human rights 
may also fall short of the Joint Declaration ideals. Basic Law stipulations 
regarding the need for legislative action to address the "threats" of subversion 
and sedition (Article 23), which have now come to haunt Hong Kong, and 
allowing mainland interference during periods of "turmoil" (Article 18) are 
notable examples. By the same token, key liberal laws promulgated before the 
transfer of sovereignty, following the 1991 enactment of the Bill of Rights, were 
set aside unceremoniously. The legislative measures offered as an alternative 
incorporate the notion of national security into the public order and societies 
laws, weaken labour law safeguards, and reverse a host of legal reforms spurred 
by the Bill of Rights.28 
Insofar as the rule of law is concerned, the gap between pre-1997 
expectations and subsequent reality has not widened to the same extent, but the 
picture is not entirely reassuring. On the positive side, the constitutional judicial 
review of local legislation for conformity to the Basic Law appears to have taken 
root. In a landmark decision, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal declared that 
it had the power to examine both local and National People's Congress (NPC) 
legislative acts in terms of this yardstick."9 On the negative side, mainland 
officials and pro-China local elements inveighed against the judgment, claiming 
that the Court was trying to put itself above the NPC. Indeed, they insistently 
called for the ruling to be "rectified".30 
Unsurprisingly, the Hong Kong Government responded to the challenge 
by filing a motion to "clarify" the decision regarding this matter. The Court then 
issued a clarifying judgment that merely restated its original ruling, but affirmed 
Davis, Constitutionalism and Hong Kong's Future, op. cit. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal Nos. 14, 
15, and 16 of 1998, January 29, 1999. The case, combining three test cases on appeal, 
involved the right of abode of mainland born children of Hong Kong residents. Article 
24(3) of the Basic Law placed such children unequivocally in categories of persons 
entitled to permanent residence in the territory. The lower courts had upheld legislation 
restricting the entry of such children subject to a lengthy certificate of entitlement and 
exit permit process on the mainland. These provisions and others relating to children 
born out of wedlock and imposing retroactivity of the laws were found unconstitutional. 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the NPC created Provisional Legislature, a 
legislative body that operated during the first year following the transfer of sovereignty 
and had enacted the legislation in question. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
26 
27 
28 
11 
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that if was not above the NPC and could not question "the authority of the NPC 
and its Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the 
provisions of the Basic Law and the procedure therein".31 The Court's stance 
throughout this disturbing episode bodes well for the rule of law in Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, the intense pressure emanating from mainland and sympathetic 
local sources (including the Government), which has since periodically 
resurfaced in one form or another, suggests that the "war", as distinct from the 
"battle", may have not necessarily been won.32 
Democratisation, particularly pace thereof, is not an entirely 
uncontroversial issue in Hong Kong. Some serious observers of the local 
political scene argue that the territory needs to strike a balance between 
"electoral representation" and "authoritarian decisiveness" rather than pursue the 
former goal with a single-minded determination. This unfashionable view, yet 
one that cannot be dismissed altogether, reflects concerns about the potential 
impact on policy effectiveness in a quintessentially capitalist setting of providing 
universal franchise in a premature fashion from a socio-economic perspective. 
Optimal timing is deemed to be crucial to the success of the enterprise (which is 
akin to embracing "gradualism") because of the perception that Hong Kong, its 
veneer of political conservatism notwithstanding, remains a metropolis where 
affluence is not widely shared and populist sentiment may manifest itself in both 
a powerful and disruptive form.33 
While the gulf between the advocates of rapid political reform and 
proponents of executive-led government (i.e., status quo) remains wide, there is 
less disagreement regarding the need to safeguard human rights and the rule of 
law.34 The steps taken by the authorities in the opposite direction, culminating in 
the unveiling of the new national security legislation, are thus considered to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with the public interest, as well as highly divisive. 
The government has since partially retreated in the face of an unprecedented 
grass-roots protest. It has initially offered to amend the bill (Table 4) and has 
subsequently decided to shelve it temporarily on largely opportunistic grounds 
(in order to minimize short-term electoral damage to pro-China organized 
political forces). However, it is reasonable to assume that the gap between its 
blueprint and the aspirations of parties committed to liberal constitutional 
principles (Table 5) is unlikely to narrow dramatically. 
Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal Nos 14, 15, 
and 16 of 1998, February 26, 1999. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
W.H. Overholt, Hong Kong, 12 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 3-18 (October, 2001). 
Ibid. 
32 
33 
34 
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Table 4 
A Bill Too Far 
It is now all but certain that within the next few days Hong Kong will have a 
new internal-security law which, were it a democracy, could never be passed. 
Fortunately for the government in Beijing and its hand-picked chief executive in 
Hong Kong, the bumbling and deeply unpopular Tung Chee-hwa, it is not a 
democracy. Only 24 of the 60 seats in Hong Kong's Legislative Council are directly 
elected. 
The bill is not wholly bad, and it is to the government's credit that it has paid 
some attention since its original outline proposals were published for comment last 
year. In some respects it even marks an improvement on the existing colonial laws: 
the crimes of treason and sedition, for instance, are now properly defined, in terms of 
the commission of violence. On the other hand, whole new crimes, principally those 
of "sub-version" and secession", the former already used with gay abandon against 
dissidents in China, have been introduced. 
There are plenty of other complaints. One section of the bill provides a 
mechanism to ban any organization in Hong Kong that is deemed to be subordinate to 
one banned in China on security grounds - which could easily be used against the 
religious group Falun Gong, or perhaps against the Hong Kong Alliance, which 
organized protests in China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Also included is a 
clause that would make it an offence for newspapers to publish material gleaned from 
secret state documents, without any countervailing public-interest defence. Though 
abuse of any of these innovations seems unlikely in the current climate, they would 
be most useful to a compliant leader in Hong Kong in the event of a future political 
upheaval in China. 
All these defects, coupled no doubt with a general sense of dissatisfaction, drew 
close to 500,000 people on to the streets of Hong Kong to protest on July 1st (see 
page 25). It was by far the largest demonstration seen there since 1989, when the 
Tiananmen massacre brought out a million, forever shattering the myth that Hong 
Kong cares only about business. Hong Kong's Democrats have tabled amendments to 
correct these abuses. They will be debated next week. But given Legco's 
composition, they have virtually no chance of success. 
The bill, however, is not just bad in some of its particulars: it is bad in principle, 
too. Even if the amendments the Democrats would like to see were miraculously 
passed, its timing is hopeless. Hong Kong's economy has suffered a treble blow in 
recent years, from the Asian financial crisis, the post-September 11lh slowdown and, 
more lately, SARS. It is a fragile creature that could do without self-inflicted wounds 
of this kind. 
The great mystery in all this is just why China ever embarked on such a course. 
Apart from anything else, it is having a powerful effect on Taiwan's interest in any 
form of reunification with the mainland. Hong Kong and the mainland have lived 
together on the whole pretty happily over the past six years: for the most part, Hong 
Kong's Democrats have kept their politics local. It is true that the security bill is a 
requirement laid on the Hong Kong government by Article 23 of the Basic Law, 
Hong Kong's constitution. But until last year, the whole matter had been quietly 
neglected. 
If the bill does go through unaltered, one casualty is sure to be Hu Jintao's 
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reputation in the West. On June 19' , President Bush's spokesman explicitly called 
for the bill to be modified, and implicitly threatened that, if it is not, there may be 
economic consequences. Mr Hu, who has been China's president for the past four 
months, though leader of its Communist Party for eight, has sometimes been viewed 
as a potential if cautious reformer. Encouragingly, he has been more open than would 
have been possible in the past about a recent submarine accident, and he dismissed a 
minister and a mayor over China's flat-footed and secretive response to SARS. But 
by allowing the tame government in Hong Kong to press ahead with the security bill, 
and by failing in his eagerly awaited speech of July Is' to support even the most 
limited of political reforms, he has now disappointed the world twice. 
Source: The Economist, July 5, 2003, pp. 11-12. 
Table 5 
Spot The Difference 
What the government 
proposes 
Amendments proposed by 
pro-democracy lawmakers 
Joining foreign armed forces at war with China, 
intending to overthrow, intimidate or compel the 
central government to change its policies or 
measures 
"Intimidate" and "compel the 
central government to change its 
policies or measures" should be 
deleted because they are too 
vague and broad 
Instigating foreign armed forces to invade China Speech, words, gestures or 
expression should be excluded 
Assisting public enemies at war with China by 
doing anything to prejudice China's position in 
the war 
Anti-war protests, medical and 
humanitarian assistance and 
actions to promote peace should 
be excluded 
Disestablishing the basic system of China as 
established by the constitution, overthrowing or 
intimidating the central government by using 
force, serious criminal means that seriously 
endanger the stability of China or engaging in 
war 
"Disestablish" and "intimidate" 
should be deleted as too vague. 
Intent to overthrow the 
government should be proven 
"Serious criminal means" should 
be "intentional acts of violence" 
and should exclude advocacy, 
protest and existing criminal 
offences that carry a maximum 
seven-year prison term 
Withdrawing any part of China from its "Intent" should be added and the 
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sovereignty by using force, serious criminal 
means that endanger the territorial integrity or 
engaging in war 
offence clarified. Anything done 
in respect of a state of separation 
existing at the time the law is 
enacted should not be an offence 
Intentionally inciting others to commit treason, 
subversion or secession or to engage in HK or 
elsewhere in violent public disorder that would 
seriously endanger China's stability. Incitement 
should make it likely for a person to be induced 
to commit the crime 
The incitement should make it 
likely for a person to 
"immediately" commit the 
crime. The penalty should be 
reduced from life imprisonment 
to seven years for inciting 
treason, subversion and 
secession and to five years for 
inciting violent public disorder 
Handling seditious publications likely to induce a 
person to commit the above offences with intent 
to incite them, including publishing, selling, 
distributing, displaying, importing or exporting 
them 
Handling seditious publications 
should not be an offence at all 
It is not an offence to show the central or HK 
government has been misled or is mistaken, to 
point our errors, to persuade the public to try to 
lawfully alter or remove any matter in China or 
HK or to draw attention to a matter 
Theft of State Secrets 
Unlawful and damaging disclosure by a former 
or current public servant or illegal access to 
information relating to HK affairs that fall within 
the mainland's responsibility if the disclosure 
endangers or would be likely to endanger 
national security 
Engaging in reporting China or 
Hong Kong news should not be 
covered under the sedition law 
Should not be used to protect a 
government from embarrassment 
or conceal wrongdoing and 
should not be an offence if the 
information has already been 
published or is available in the 
public domain 
Public interest is a defence if the disclosure 
reveals unlawful activity, abuse of power, serious 
neglect of duty or other serious misconduct by 
public officials or a serious threat to public order, 
security, health or safety and does not exceed the 
extent necessary for revealing the matter 
Proscription of groups 
The secretary for security may ban groups if she 
reasonably believes it necessary for national 
security. If their objective is to engage in or are 
trying to commit the above offences. 
Membership, aiding or attending meetings of 
Public interest should be a 
defence with no strings attached 
The proscription offence should 
be deleted 
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banned groups is an offence. Members may 
appeal the decision in court. The secretary may 
make regulations for the appeal and this appeal 
may be held in the absence of the appellant and 
lawyer if necessary 
Chinese nationals who are HK permanent 
residents who commit these acts outside HK will 
be covered 
They should not be covered. 
Time limits and penalties are too 
high and several minor technical 
amendments needed 
Source: South China Morning Post, July 7, 2003, p. 3. 
The ultimate form of the national security legislation is highly relevant from a 
short-term policy perspective. The medium-term outlook, on the other hand, is 
essentially a foregone conclusion, irrespective of the outcome of the current 
manoeuvring. The reason lies in the fact that the shape of China's strategy with 
respect to constitutional evolution in Hong Kong appears to have basically 
crystallized. The ill-fated bill is merely a manifestation, albeit a distinctly 
unpalatable one, of this strategy which seems directed toward shifting the 
balance, even if not decisively for the foreseeable future, from the liberal to the 
authoritarian end of the constitutional spectrum.35 It is useful to explore the 
thrust and implications of the strategic posture adopted by the Chinese 
leadership in that regard, and implemented through a variety of channels, within 
a politico-economic/game-theoretic framework. 
Hong Kong's constitutional predicament, resulting from a clash between 
authoritarian forces (represented by China and its local "proxies") and their 
liberal counterparts (spearheaded by middle class professionals but not confined 
to this narrow stratum), falls into a category of "games" (situations, in common 
parlance) known as "social dilemmas". The latter refer to circumstances where 
"players" (individuals, groups, organizations, etc.) make choices involving a 
high degree of interdependence. The distinguishing characteristic of such games 
is that if each player in a one-shot or finitely repeated process of interaction 
selects strategies on the presently accepted, "rational-choice" model of decision 
making, all players will realize a payoff at an equilibrium outcome of less value 
than one or more of the available alternatives (i.e., a "sub-optimal" configuration 
will ensue).36 
35 
36 
Davis, Constitutionalism and Hong Kong's Future, op. cit. 
E. OSTROM AND J. WALKER, TRUST AND RECIPROCITY. (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2003). 
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The existence of at least one outcome that can yield superior returns for 
all participants is the source of the "dilemma". This outcome is attainable, but to 
secure it the players need to trust one another. Where that is not the case, rational 
participants making interdependent choices are not expected to gravitate toward 
this "Pareto-optimai" configuration ("Pareto efficiency" is achieved when no 
party can be made better off without another party being made worse off). A 
conflict is thereby posed between acting in an individually rational fashion and 
gaining sufficient trust to obtain the optimal outcome for the group. The problem 
of "collective action" raised by social dilemmas is to discover a way to avoid 
"Pareto-inferior" configurations and move closer to the optimum. 7 
Social dilemmas abound in human affairs. They have been examined by 
biologists, economists, evolutionary psychologists, game theorists, historians, 
legal scholars, mathematicians, philosophers, political scientists, sociologists and 
social psychologists. The problem of providing, in the absence of voluntary 
social cooperation (or incentives to engage in socially-minded behaviour), 
essential "public goods" - including clean air, national defence, and safe streets 
- is one example. Another can be found in the difficulties stemming from 
socially damaging action by appropriators "selfishly" using (or, to be exact, 
"overusing") an "open-access common-pool resource", such as the ocean 
fisheries, rather than jointly harvesting it at a rate that would maximize benefits 
to the group as a whole (or the sustainability of the resource).38 
The best-known form of social dilemma in the "prisoner's dilemma". It 
is an imaginary construct in which two partners in crime, separated from each 
other in prison, are individually motivated to defect (that is, to inform the 
prosecutor about the other prisoner's involvement in the crime). The partner who 
defects will improve his or her outcome, earning release or a diminished 
sentence, provided the other does not. If the two partners defect, both will face 
the maximum punishment for the crime. On the other hand, if the two partners 
remain silent, the penalty for both will be relatively mild (the optimal 
configuration from their perspective in this context).39 
Social dilemmas feature increasingly in legal analysis but seldom at the 
constitutional level. The United States qualifies as the exception to the norm, 
albeit on a limited scale. A notable example is the potentially harmful inter-state 
competition for a share of the national pie. The framers of the American 
constitution did not assume that altruism would govern commercial relations. 
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When it comes to business, asserted Hamilton, "men are ambitious, vindictive, 
and rapacious".41 Legislators representing parochial (i.e., state) interests might 
be expected to act accordingly, undermining "the principle of the unitary 
national market".42 As Hamilton opined, "[e]ach state, or separate confederacy, 
would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would 
occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget 
discontent".43 
To forestall such a divisive outcome, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Commerce Clause to include an implied Dormant Commerce Clause. Under 
the latter, states may not, in their dealings with each other, engage in 
protectionism - that is, take initiatives "whose purpose or effect is to gain for 
those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to burden 
those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those within".44 It 
would not be unreasonable for the federal government to act in such a manner 
against a foreign country, yet there is no foreign entity among the several states. 
They are supposed to pass laws for their own benefit but not detrimental to the 
national interest. Their propensity to deviate from this pattern is indicative of the 
fact that federal-state relations, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, reflect 
tensions similar to those that manifest themselves in the context of the prisoner's 
dilemma.45 
Social dilemmas loom larger in the study of international relations than 
constitutional affairs. Trust, mistrust, or a combination of the two, is normally a 
key factor in the analytical equation. Typically, structural realists veer toward 
mistrust, arguing that that there is "little room for trust among states" because 
intentions are difficult to discern and hence fear "can never be reduced to a 
trivial level".46 Defence realists are less unequivocal in this respect, yet they too 
acknowledge the persistence of security dilemmas, which are hypothesized to 
compel states to arm against each other even though the protagonists would 
prefer mutual cooperation. At the heart of a security dilemma is mistrust, a fear 
that the other side is malevolently inclined and bound to exploit one's 
cooperation rather than reciprocate it.47 
M.I. MEYERSON, POLITICAL NUMERACY. (New York: Norton, 2002), p. 115. 
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The US-Soviet arms race, a major element in the twentieth-century 
international political dynamics, has been dissected within this framework, and 
so has a number of other, less prominent, international conflicts. Specifically, it 
has been suggested that such escalations may be viewed as "perceptual 
dilemmas" with three characteristics: each side most prefers mutual 
disarmament, each side least prefers unilateral disarmament, and each side 
thinks the other actually prefers superiority to mutual agreement (incorrectly, as 
the first assumption makes clear). Empirical data have been adduced from 
various settings to lend support to this thesis and the conflict management 
strategies derived from it.48 
Social dilemmas that revolve around trust have at least three standard 
components and two, often implicit ones. First, the relationship involves a 
truster, a trusted, and some matter that is at stake in the trust, so that it is a 
trilateral structure. Second, the trusted has some incentive to be trustworthy with 
respect to the matter at issue in the truster's trust. Third, this incentive might be 
trumped by other considerations, so that there is some risk of default by the 
trusted. The two, often implicit components are the claims that trust is cognitive 
and that it is not a primitive term. To say that trust is cognitive is to say that our 
trust in another is essentially a matter of relevant knowledge about the other - in 
particular, knowledge of reasons the other has to be trustworthy. To say that 
"trust" is not a primitive term means that it must be reducible to other terms, 
including the terms included in these standard components.49 
Perhaps the best-known and widely influential analysis of trust in the 
social dilemma context has been provided by Coleman, who has constructed a 
game theoretic framework with two actors, a truster and a trusted. He has opted 
for an illustration featuring one farmer faced with the decision whether to help 
another farmer bale hay. The first farmer has not received a favour from the 
second and has no positive reassurance that the second will return the favour 
currently being contemplated. Later on, the first farmer will seek a favour from 
the second farmer, who will then decide whether to reciprocate the first farmer's 
earlier cooperation or to exploit it by not cooperating. The crucial dilemma for 
the first farmer lies in the fact that he does not know if the second farmer is 
trustworthy or not - that is, whether the second farmer is inclined to return 
favours when needed.50 
This scenario can be formalized in a simple incomplete information 
game (Figure 1). Nature first decides whether to make player 2 trustworthy or 
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untrustworthy. It is convenient to refer to the trustworthy player who returns 
favours as "nice" and the untrustworthy player who does not as "mean." The 
main difference between the types is that the nice one prefers to reciprocate 
cooperation, whereas the mean one does not. In technical parlance, this implies 
that the nice type's payoff for cooperation, RN (symbolizing "reward" for 
cooperation), is higher than his payoff for exploiting the other side's 
cooperation, TN (symbolizing temptation to defect). For the mean type, the 
temptation to defect, TM, exceeds the reward for cooperation, RM.51 
Figure I 
The Trust game 
Nature 
Adapted from: Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory. 
Nature makes player 2 nice with probability p, choosing the right branch of the 
game tree, and mean with probability 1 - p, on the left branch of the tree. As 
indicated by the information set linking player l's decision nodes, player 1 is not 
informed of what type of player is being faced. However, the probability that 
player 2 is nice,/?, is known to player 1 and can be thought of as player l's level 
of trust. The greater p is, the more certain player 1 is that player 2 is trustworthy, 
and so the greater is player's 1 's level of trust for player 2.52 
This prior level of trust may be a product of several factors. In 
international settings, for example, a state which has had previous interactions 
with another state featuring a high degree of hostility use adopt a low level ofp 
in considering its strategic options. France's distrust of Germany in the 
Ibid. 
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immediate post-World War II era, which prompted it to oppose strongly German 
rearmament, was thus a natural result of the French experience of being invaded 
by Germany three times in the past seventy years.53 
The prior level of trust could also be a reflection of generalized 
experience with many other states. If a state found in the course of its 
interactions that most states in its neighbourhood honour their trade 
commitments, for instance, it may then have a generally trusting prior belief, or 
high/?, when it commences a trade relationship with a new, more distant trading 
partner. By the same token, the prior could be influenced by theories or 
hypotheses about state behaviour as they apply to specific cases. A democracy 
that regards political systems like its own as generally more peaceful, at least 
toward other democracies, may therefore approach a relationship with a new 
democracy with a greater level of trust than vis-a-vis an authoritarian state. 
Accordingly, while most new revolutionary regimes are viewed with fear and 
suspicion, which may in some circumstances lead to war, the new regimes in 
Eastern Europe that emerged circa 1989 were welcomed by the Western 
democracies because their revolutionary transformations propelled them in the 
direction of Western norms.54 
Following Nature's choice, player 1 has the first move and may 
cooperate or defect. If player 1 decides to cooperate, player 2 has the option to 
reciprocate that cooperation or exploit it by defecting. If player 1 does not decide 
to cooperate, the game ends and the payoffs are zero for both players. If player 1 
cooperates but player 2 does not, player 1 gets the sucker's payoff, -S, and player 
2 gets the temptation to defect, TN if nice or TM if mean. The game then ends.53 
What are the equilibria of the trust game? Backward induction shows 
that on the right branch where player 2 is nice, player 2 will cooperate, and on 
the left branch where player 2 is mean, player 2 will defect. Given that player 1 
values the reward for mutual cooperation over mutual non-cooperation, R > 0, 
player 1 has an incentive to cooperate if player 1 thinks player 2 is likely enough 
to be nice. The payoff for cooperation for player 1 is pR + (1 - p) (-S), and this 
will be greater than zero, the payoff for defecting, if/? (the level of trust player 1 
has for player 2) exceeds a critical threshold p* defined in the following 
equation:56 
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*
 s 
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 -RTT 
Ifp > p*, player 1 is trusting enough of player 2 to cooperate. If p <p*, then 
player 1 is too mistrustful to cooperate and will defect. Thus p* is a critical value 
for player 1 and defines player 1 's attitude toward the risk of being exploited in a 
trust relationship. The greater p* is, the more trusting player 1 has to be, to be 
willing to cooperate in a trust game. The lower/?* is, the greater the risk of being 
exploited player 1 is willing to run in order to secure mutual cooperation.57 
The values of the payoffs affect this critical value of trust in a 
straightforward way. The worse the sucker's payoff, the higher the critical value 
will be. That is, as the payoff for being exploited for player 1 decreases, the 
more trusting player 1 must be in order to be willing to cooperate. Increasing the 
reward for mutual cooperation, R, has the opposite effect: it lowers the threshold 
for cooperation. The greater the rewards for mutual cooperation, the greater the 
risk player 1 will be willing to run in an effort to secure them.58 
In international settings, states that place a higher value on the rewards 
of mutual cooperation, or are less adversely affected if their overtures go 
unrequited, will thus have a lower p* and will be willing to cooperate at lower 
levels of trust. A lower value on mutual cooperation or a greater sensitivity to 
the pain of being exploited will make for a higher p*, producing cooperation 
only for higher levels of trust, and defection otherwise. 
The trust game is a convenient way to formulate the problem of mistrust 
rigorously, and it confirms some intuitive conceptions about how the interaction 
between the level of trust and the payoff affect the possibility of cooperation. 
Conflict arises because mistrust becomes too high, and there is a critical 
threshold of trust, p*, above which the rational course of action is to cooperate, 
and below which the rational course of action is to defect. The model seems to 
validate the traditional structural realist gloom about mistrust and cooperation in 
international relations.60 
The two-party relationship, as portrayed thus far, is limited in nature 
because the players "react" to each other in a static fashion, but they do not 
"interact" in a dynamic manner. To qualify as a game of mutual trust in the true 
sense of the term, the model should feature interaction involving a long sequence 
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of "exchanges" between the parties. This takes the form of an iterated prisoner's 
dilemma with, perhaps, some variation in the stakes at each exchange.61 
In real life, it is not likely to be a game of simultaneous moves. 
Normally, it is one of sequential moves, in which a player takes the risk of doing 
something for another today in the expectation that the latter will reciprocate in 
some way tomorrow. The key incentive that one faces in an exchange in which 
one is trusted by another party is the potential benefit from continuing the series 
of interactions. The sanction that can be invoked in such circumstances is to 
withdraw from further interaction. In some contexts, this is a substantial sanction 
because there might be no suitable party for future interactions.62 
This politico-economic/game-theoretic model provides an effective 
framework for explaining how China and its local proxies (player 1) have sown 
the seeds of a constitutional crisis in Hong Kong. Chinese foreign policy has 
traditionally been characterized by a low level of trust vis-a-vis other parties in 
the international arena. More often than not, the strategic choice, to all intents 
and purposes, has been to "defect" rather than "cooperate".63 Hong Kong has not 
been the exception to the norm, in the political (as distinct from economic) sense 
of the term. Liberal forces (player 2) - advocating (in an orderly fashion) 
democratic reform, protection of human rights, and commitment to the rule of 
law - have been assumed to be "mean".64 
These forces have consequently been isolated at the policy level, unable 
to participate meaningfully in the strategy formulation process and influence the 
content of major decisions. The meanness has thus become a "self-fulfilling 
prophecy". Withdrawal from the game, or non-cooperation, has been the 
inevitable response. The tactics have included not just grass-roots mobilization, 
with anti-establishment (and hence China) overtones, but also appeals for 
support in the West. The latter have reinforced the perception ("mistrust") in 
Beijing that the "battle" is being waged by "subversive" elements (initially pro-
British, and now anti-communist) whose ultimate goal is to undermine the 
present regime on the mainland.65 
This game of mistrust has culminated in the massive protest against the 
proposed national security legislation. The unprecedented demonstration of 
discontent by the public has been a reaction to the policy style adopted by the 
government throughout this episode, and in broadly similar circumstances in the 
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past, as well as the thrust of the new initiative. The strategy of exclusion, of 
keeping liberal elements (or, for that matter, any party not fully trusted by 
entrenched pro-China elites) at an arm's length, has produced a backlash whose 
powerful reverberations seriously threaten Hong Kong's constitutional - indeed, 
possibly overall - stability.66 
The challenge lies in transforming the game of mistrust into one of trust, 
or at least shifting tangibly from one end of the spectrum to the other. The 
literature on conflict management is not short of insights that might prove useful 
in this respect. Most of them revolve around the notion of "reassurance", which 
in practice takes the form of trust-building gestures initiated by one or both of 
the players in an effort to encourage cooperation over time. The underlying 
assumption is that reassurance of the right kind, and at the appropriate juncture, 
can elicit a favourable response from "nice" types.67 
There is certainly scope for employing this tactic as part of a well-
coordinated strategy designed to defuse the constitutional crisis in Hong Kong. 
The government in particular could adopt a more enlightened approach in 
dealing with its "adversaries". Rather than driving the process in a heavy-handed 
top-down fashion, with the blessing of its "controllers" in Beijing and on the 
ground, it ought to engage them in a proper dialogue and display genuine 
willingness to pursue the exchanges in a constructive manner.68 
That being said, the crisis has arguably reached a point whereby 
incremental changes in style and substance may prove insufficient to contain it. 
In the parlance of game theory, the government probably has no choice but to 
resort to a very strong form of reassurance featuring "costly signalling".69 In 
other words, the gestures offered should involve substantial sacrifices on its part. 
Specifically, the recycled national security bill ought to pose no palpable threat 
to human rights, the rule of law, and Hong Kong's open-society architecture. 
CONCLUSION 
Pre-1997 anxieties regarding the political implications of the transfer of 
sovereignty from Britain to China have not really been validated by subsequent 
developments. Post-1997 Hong Kong may have lost some of its previous 
economic luster, but on the face of it the institutional fabric has remained largely 
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intact. Nevertheless, a subtle shift in a more authoritarian direction has 
undoubtedly taken place. Recently, there has been a worrisome acceleration in 
the trend, as evidenced by the unveiling of the proposed national security 
legislation. 
It has become apparent that the policy establishment has decided to 
reshape the institutional order in a way that is inconsistent with the letter and 
spirit of the Joint Declaration. The resultant muscle flexing by an increasingly 
disaffected grass-roots community has plunged Hong Kong into a deep 
constitutional crisis. From an analytical perspective, this sequence of events can 
be described as highly predictable. It is also difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that, to break the vicious circle, the government may have to change radically its 
modus operandi and seriously rethink its stance with respect to constitutional 
reform in general and this controversial issue in particular. 
